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Résumé:
Ce chapitre d’ouvrage collectif a pour but de présenter les modèles clas-
siques de décision dans l’incertain, c.a.d. dans des situations où les événements
n’ont pas de probabilité "objective". Nous présentons successivement les deux
principales théories, leur axiomatique, la justi…cation et l’interprétation de leurs
axiomes et leurs principales propriétés : d’abord, le modèle d’Espérance d’Utilité
Subjective, dû à Savage (Savage, 1954), puis la théorie dûe à Anscombe-Aumann
(Anscombe and Aumann, 1963), dans un cadre di¤érent. Les deux théories im-
posent l’usage d’une représentation probabiliste. Nous discutons ensuite ces
théories en liaison avec le résultat expérimental connu sous le nom de "Para-
doxe d’Ellsberg ".
Mots clé: Incertain, Probabilité sub jective, Espérance d’Utilité Subjective,
Savage, Anscombe et Aumann, Paradoxe d’ Ellsberg.
JEL: D81
Abstract
This chapter of a collective book is dedicated to classical decision models
under uncertainty, i.e. under situations where events do not have "objective"
probabilities with which the Decision Maker agrees. We present successively the
two main theories, their axiomatic, the interpretation and the justi…cation of
their axioms and their main properties: …rst, the general model of Subjective
Expected Utility due to Savage (Savage, 1954), second, the Anscombe-Aumann
(1963) theory, in a di¤erent framework. Both theories enforce the universal use
of a probabilistic representation. We then discuss this issue in connection with
the experimental result known as the Ellsberg paradox.
Key words: Uncertainty, Sub jective Probability, Subjective Expected Utility,
Savage, Anscombe and Aumann, Ellsberg Paradox.
JEL: D81
2
1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to classical decision models under uncertainty. Fol-
lowing Knight (1921), the term risk is reserved to situations in which events
have "ob jective" probabilities with which the DM agrees. This is typically the
case in games of chance, such as card games, roulette, etc.; risk also encom-
passes all situations in which reliable statistical data are available. In addition
to situations of risk, there seems to be a great variety of other situations of
uncertainty that the DM can encounter: upper/lower probability intervals, pos-
sibilities/necessities, complete ignorance, small samples, etc.
Rather surprisingly, the classical models of decision making under uncertainty
enforce the universal use of a probabilistic representation: every situation of un-
certainty is identi…able to a situation of subjective risk. This means that every
DM behaves "as if" he had probabilistic beliefs on all the events; on the other
hand, these beliefs can vary from one DM to another.
The justi…cation of this representation is based on axioms of ”rational behav-
ior”. The most famous model giving an axiomatic justi…cation of the Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) criterion is due to L.J. Savage (1954): uncertainty re-
duces to subjective risk and decisions are ranked according to the expected
utilities (EU) of their consequences.
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) also justify the SEU criterion, with a dif-
ferent model and in a di¤erent framework.
We present successively these two theories and insist on the interpretation
and the justi…cation of the axioms; we only provide an outline of the proofs.
2 Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
2.1 De…nitions and notations
S is the set of states of nature, E ½ 2S a set of parts of S, A 2 E an event and
C the set of consequences.
Decisions are identi…ed to acts, which are applications from S into C ; axiom
P8 will introduce a "measurability” requirement. An act f is a simple step
act (resp. step act ) when there exists a …nite (resp. denumerable) partition
fEi; i 2 Ig of S , with Ei 2 E for every i 2 I , such that f (Ei) = fcig - a
singleton. In particular, a constant act, ±c is characterized by ±c(S) = fcg.
A graft is an operation which associates with two acts f , g and an event E
a third act h de…ned by: h(s) = f (s) for s 2 E; h(s) = g(s) for s 2 E c; such an
act is denoted by h = fEg.
Preferences are represented by binary relation % on the set of acts V:
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2.2 The SEU criterion
Preferences % comply with Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory when
they can be explained by the expected utility criterion, i.e. when there exist a
(subjective) probability measure P on the events and a utility function u on the
consequences such that, for all acts f , g :
f % g () RS u(f (:))dP ¸ RS u(g(:))dP
Savage (1954) and later Anscombe and Aumann (1963), have proposed
axiomatic justi…cations of this criterion; Anscombe and Aumann, require a
special structure for the consequence set, which is the set of all lotteries (…nite
support distributions) on the outcome set; they moreover assume the validity
of the EU criterion for comparing these lotteries.
Savage’s framework is more general, and may seem more natural, since it does
not require any particular structure on the consequence set; on the other hand,
his approach is rather complex; Anscombe and Aumann have a simpler task,
since they can take advantage of the properties of linear utility on the lotteries.
We begin with the presentation of the theory of Savage.
3 The theory of Savage
3.1 Savage’s axioms, their interpretation and some impli-
cations
N.B. The axiom system presented here is somewhat di¤erent from that of Sav-
age: it leads to a representation of the beliefs on the events by a ¾-additive
probability measure(as opposed to a simply additive probability in Savage’s).
3.1.1 Preferences on the acts
The …rst axiom postulates the existence of a rich structure on both the set of
the events and the set of the acts and requires that the preference relation be a
weak order (re‡exivity, transitivity and completeness).
P1 Weak ordering of the acts
(i) The set of the events E is a ¾-algebra;
(ii) The set of the acts V contains all step acts and is closed with respect
the grafting operation.
(iii) % is a weak order on V.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are technical; the structures imposed to E and V
could not be dispensed with, even though they imply the existence of unrealis-
tic acts (for instance of acts giving good consequences conditionally on unfavor-
able events); condition (iii) is standard in decision theory; note, though, that
standard rationality arguments such as the avoidance of money pumps forbid
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preference cycles but cannot justify completeness.
The next axiom is the key axiom of Savage’s theory. It states that a com-
mon modi…cation of the common part of two acts cannot modify the preference
order between them.
P2 Sure Thing Principle
For all acts f; g;h; h0 and for every eventE ,
fEh % gEh () fEh0 % gEh0
Here again money pump arguments can only justify the following weakened
version of P2:
P02 fEh Â gEh =) fEh0 % gEh0
This is an important remark for the following reason: backward induction is
an e¢cient method for solving dynamic decision problems; it turns out, that its
validity does not rely on P2 but only on P02; this opens the gate to alternative
theories which, despite the fact they use di¤erent representations of uncertainty,
remain operational.
Let us …nally note that actual behavior often violates the Sure Thing princi-
ple P2; and P02 as well; see below (section 2.3) the Ellsberg (1961) paradox;
the Allais (1953) paradox can itself be presented as a violation of these axioms.
Induced preferences The axiom system will make it possible to derive from
one primitive, preference relation % on the acts, several other binary relations,
which will be interpreted as conditional preferences, preferences under certainty,
preferences on the events, etc.
Conditional preferences given events For any event E 2 E ; P2 allows
one to de…ne on the set of acts V a binary relation, preference given E , by:
f %E g ()for every h, fEh % gEh
Relation %E can be trivial, i.e. such that f %E g for all f; g 2 V, in which
case event E is called a null event; in particular, ; is a null event.
Let us note that %E only depends on the restrictions of f and g to E .
This relation is generally interpreted, when E is not null, as the expression of
the DM’s preferences conditionally to E , but this is only an interpretation (cf
Ghirardato, 2002).
It is clear that, for every event E 2 E , %E (preference given E) is a weak
order.
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Preferences under certainty Preferences on acts % also induce prefer-
ences under certainty, %C ; by
c0 %C c00 () ±c0 % ±c00 for all c0; c00 2 C.
Relation %C also is a weak order.
The introduction of %C is not interesting unless there exists intrinsic pref-
erences under certainty, i.e. which do not depend on the information in the
following sense:
P3 Existence of intrinsic preferences under certainty
For all consequences c0; c00 2 C , for every non-null event E 2 E ,
c0 %C c00 () ±c0 %E ±c00
This axiom is more restrictive than it seems: for instance, it does not leave
the possibility of expressing the in‡uence on the ordering of consequences of an
emotional trauma. Certain theories allow state dependent preferences, and do
not require this axiome (see Karni and Schmeidler, 1993).
Preferences on the events We de…ne next a preference relation on the
events; for this, we shall use a particular class of step acts: the one-step acts.
Given c0; c00 2 C such that c0 ÂC c00, act fA o¤ers prize(c0=c00) on A when
fA (s) = c0 if s 2 A; fA(s) = c00 if s 2 Ac
A preference relation %E on the set of events E can then be de…ned by:
For all A; B 2 E , A %E B ()
there exists a prize (c0=c00) such that acts fA; fB o¤ering that prize on A and
B, respectively, satisfy fA % fB
The next axiom states that the value of the prize does not matter at all,
which will make relation %E a weak order.
Its interpretation is the following: if, for a given prize, one prefers fA to fB ,
it is because one believes A to be more likely to obtain that B:
P4 Non-in‡uence of the prize
For all consequences c0; c00; k0; k00 2 C such that c0 ÂC c00 and k0 ÂC k00; for
every act fA ( resp. fB) o¤ering prize (c0=c0 0) on event A (resp. B ) 2 E , and
every act gA (resp. gB) o¤ering prize (k0=k 00) on event A (resp. B ):
fA % fB () gA % gB
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To prevent %E of being trivial, there must exist at least one feasible prize:
P5 Non-triviality of preferences under certainty
There exists consequences c0; c00 2 C such that c0 ÂC c 00:
Note that E is null if and only if E »E ;.
Together, the preceding assumptions are su¢cient to endow relation %E with
properties Q1 and Q2 of a qualitative probability (see below).
We shall need the following de…nition:
An event A ÂE ; is an atom (for %E) when there is no event B ½ A such
that: A ÂE B ÂE ;:
The next axiom will in particular imply that set S is atomless (for %E), a
property which will prove to be crucial for the existence of a unique subjective
probability. This axiom moreover implies continuity properties, related to those
of the continuity axiom of linear utility theory.
P6 Continuity
For every pair of acts f; g 2 V such that f Â g; for every consequence c 2 C ,
there exists a …nite partition fEi; i 2 Ig of S such that, for all i 2 I :
(i) fi Â g wherefi(s) = f(s) for s =2 Ei and fi(s) = c for s 2 Ei;
(ii) f Â gi wheregi(s) = g(s) for s =2 Ei and gi(s) = c for s 2 Ei
This axiom can be interpreted as follows: if the modi…cation of f on Ei
cannot reverse preferences, then each Ei must be judged su¢ciently unlikely;
one assumes thus: (i) the existence of partitions composed of arbitrarily unlikely
events, which will imply the absence of atoms; and (ii) that every fi which is
su¢ciently close from f (for the distance of weak convergence) must be ranked
in the same way that f with respect to g; which is a continuity property.
The last axiom in the original Savage system is a dominance (or monotony)
axiom:
P7 Dominance
For every event E 2 E ,
(i) f ÂE ±c for every c 2 g(E) implies f ÂE g ;
(ii) f ÁE ±c for all c 2 g(E)implies f ÁE g
This axiom states that if one prefers f to any consequence which can result
from g, then one should prefer f to g.
The last two axioms are not part of the original system of Savage; they will
make sure that the sub jective probability constructed is always ¾-additive.
P8 Measurability
For every act f 2 V and for every consequence c 2 C, sets fs 2 S : f (s) %C
cg and fs 2 S : f (s) -C cg belong to E .
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P9 Event-wise Continuity
For all events A; B 2 E and for every sequence of events (An)n2N , if
An # A; An %E B; for every n; then A %E B
3.2 The steps of Savage’s construction
Savage proves successively that:
(i) there exists, on the event set, qualitative probabilities and subjective
(quantitative) probabilities which are compatible with them. Every act gener-
ates then a (subjective) probability measure on the consequence set.
(ii) preferences on the acts generate preferences on these probability mea-
sures, and these preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
for decision making under risk.
3.2.1 From qualitative probabilities to subjectives probabilities
Existence of qualitative probabilities By de…nition, relation %E is a qual-
itative probability on E , when it satis…es the following three properties:
Q1 %E is a weak order S ÂE ; and, for all A 2 E , S %E A %E ; .
Q2 For all A1; A2; B1; B2; 2 E ,
(i) [ A1 \ A2 = ;; A1 %E B1; A2 %E B2] =) A1 [ A2 %E B1 [ B2 ;
(ii) [ A1 \ A2 = ;; A1 ÂE B1; A2 %E B2] =) A1 [ A2 ÂE B1 [ B2.
Q3 For all A; B 2 E and (An)n2N ,
[An # A; An %E B; for all n] =) A %E B .
The validity of properties Q1 and Q2 is a rather direct consequence of
axioms P1 à P5. To establish the validity of Q2, the following intermediate
property is useful:
A1 %E B1 () A1 [ E %E B1 [ E for every E such that E \ [A1 [ B1] = ;
which is a straightforward consequence of P2:
Finally, property Q3 is just axiom P9.
Therefore relation %E is a qualitative probability on E :
Remark 1 Conditions Q1 and Q2 are due to De Finetti (1937) ; Ville-
gas (1964) added axiom Q3 in order to get a ¾ -additive version of subjective
probability theory.
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Existence of a compatible subjective probability
A probability P on E is compatible with %E if P (A) = P (B) () A %E B .
It can be easily seen that conditions Q1, Q2 are necessary for the existence
of a probability P on E which is compatible with %E . A counter-example, due
to Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg (1959), shows that these conditions are
not su¢cient to insure the l’existence of a compatible probability . However,
Villegas (1967), by adding the assumption that set E is atomless, has obtained
the following result:
When E is atomless, Q1, Q2, and Q3 are su¢cient conditions for the exis-
tence of a unique subjective probability, P , on (S; E) compatible with qualitative
probability %E . Moreover:
(i) E 2 E is null if and only if P (E) = 0;
(ii) for every E 2 E and every ½ 2 (0; 1); there exists A ½ E such that
P (A) = ½P (E).
Here is an outline of Villegas’ proof:
Every event A can be divided into two sub-events A1 and A2 satisfying
A1 sE A2; this implies in turn, by an inductive argument, that there exists
a 2n-partition fEig of the sure event S with Ei sE Ej for all i; j: Necessarily, a
compatible probability P is such that P (Ei) = 1=2n for all i ; moreover, prob-
ability P (A) of an event A of E such that [
1·i·k+1Ei ÂE A %E [1·i·kEi , shall
satisfy P (A) 2 [ k
2n
;
k + 1
2n
[.
By taking the limit (n 7! 1); P (A) will be uniquely determined. Finally,
one proves the additivity and the ¾-additivity of P .
The preceding result can be interpreted roughly as follows: E contains all
events linked to the outcomes of an arbitrary sequence of coin throws, where the
coin used is believed to be unbiased by the DM. Thus to evaluate the probability
of any given event, he only need to compare it with events, linked to the throwing
sequence, to which he already attributes probabilities of the form
k
2n
.
The absence of atoms in Savage’s axiom system comes essentially from P6 :
for every non-null event A, one can …nd a partition fEig such that A ÂE Ei ÂE ;
for every i and, in particular, Ei0 such that B = Ei0 \ A satisfy A ÂE B ÂE ;.
Together, Savage’s axioms imply both the absence of atoms and the validity
of axioms Q1, Q2 and Q3, hence they imply the existence of a unique subjective
probability on the events. We are back to a problem of decision making under
risk - subjective risk here - but, as we shall see, the DM’s behavior will not di¤er
from his behavior under objective risk.
3.2.2 Subjective lotteries and linear utility
Now that a (unique) subjective probability P has been constructed on the
events, we can associate with every act f the probability measure Pf which
it generates on consequence set C (Pf is the image of P by f ). We note L0
the set of these probability measures. In particular, a simple step act generates
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a (sub jective) lottery on C, i.e. a probability measure with …nite support; if
the only feasible consequences of f are the set fxi; i = 1; :::; ng, this set is the
support of Pf and Pf (xi) = P (f¡1(xi)); i = 1; :::;ng.
One needs then to show that two acts generating the same lottery are nec-
essarily indi¤erent for relation %. This is a crucial step in the construction of
Savage, and also one of the most delicate ones. It basically exploits two prop-
erties: (i) the Sure Thing principle (P2); and (ii) the existence, for every event
A and every ½ 2 [0; 1] , of an event B ½ A such that P (B) = ½P (A).
It results from P1 that L0 is the set of all lotteries on C : There exists then,
on lottery set L0, a preference relation, induced by the preferences existing on
the acts, which we also denote by % :
P % Q () there exist simple step acts f and g such that
Pf = P , Pg = Q and f % g
Relation % on L0 is clearly a weak order,thus satisfying Axiom 1 of linear
utility theory. The next step consists in proving that it moreover satis…es Axiom
2 (independence) and Axiom 3 (continuity).
The proof of these results con…rms that P6 is indeed a continuity axiom
(and not only a non-atomicity axiom); it also stresses the narrow links between
P2 and A2; indeed, the Allais paradox constitutes a violation of both.
Thus the theorem of von Neumann-Morgenstern applies to L0: there
exists on L0 a linear utility function U and an associated vNM utility u. Re-
turning to acts, we can therefore state:
The restriction to simple step acts of preference relation % can be explained
by an expected utility criterion with respect to subjective probability measure P
on the events and utility function u on the consequences; for two such acts f
and g:
f % g () Eu(Pf ) > Eu(Pg) ()Pn
i=1 Pf (fxig)u(xi) >
Pn0
j=1 Pg(fyjg)u(yj )
It remains to extend the validity of the expected utility criterion from simple
step acts to general acts.
3.2.3 Extension of SEU to all acts
Savage’s axiom P7 which concerns acts implies the validity of dominance ax-
iom A4 for the probability measures these acts generate on C. From which it
follows that utility function u above is bounded.
Moreover, by using P8, one can show that u is also measurable so that the
integral
R
S u(f (:))dP =
R
C u(:)dPf exists and has a …nite value; then, its value
can be associated with act f .
It still remains to show that the expected utility criterion is valid for preferences
on the whole set of acts; …rst the extension from simple step acts (for which this
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criterion is straightforwardly valid) to generalized step acts is made by a similar
reasoning to that used in EU theory. The extension to general acts follows; it
uses the fact that every act is indi¤erent to a generalized step act.
One can then state Savage’s theorem :
Theorem (Savage)
Under axioms P1 to P9, preference relation % on V is representable by a
utility function U (:) of the form :
U (:) : f 7! RS u(f (:))dP = RC u(:)dPf
- whereP (:) is a (¾- additive) probability on the events of E ;
- and u(:) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility on the probability set
formed by the images of P generated by the acts.
Moreover, P is unique, whereas U(:) and u(:) are unique up to a strictly
increasing a¢ne transformation.
The empirical validity of Savage’s model has serious limitations; the Allais
paradox does not only exhibit a pattern of behavior which is incompatible with
EU under risk; this pattern is also incompatible with SEU under uncertainty.
There are other experiments, speci…c to uncertainty situations, where sub-
jects display behavioral patterns which are incompatible with the existence of
subjective probabilities (and a fortiori with SEU), such as the famous Ellsberg
paradox.
3.3 The Ellsberg paradox
Ellsberg (1961) describes the following situation: an urn contains 90 balls;
30 are red and 60 are blue or yellow, in unknown proportions; thus, there are
k blue balls and (60 ¡ k) yellow balls, with unknown k ranging from 0 to 60.
A random drawing of a ball from the urn will lead to the realisation of one of
the events R; B and Y , according to the color, Red, Blue or Yellow of the ball
drawn.
Ellsberg asks the sub jects to choose between the following decisions: a bet
on (R) (decision X1) or a bet on (B) (decision X2); and next, independently, to
choose between: a bet on (R[Y ) (decision X3) or a bet on (B[Y ) (decision X4).
The following table gives the payments (in ?) associated with each decision
fot each possible event:
R B Y
X1 100 0 0
X2 0 100 0
X3 100 0 100
X4 0 100 100
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Typically, a majority of subjects choose X1 and X4, thus revealing prefer-
ences: X1 Â X2 and X4 Â X3 ; this constitutes a violation of the Sure Thing
principle P2: a modi…cation on event y of the common consequence 0? of X1
and X2, consisting in replacing it by a di¤erent common consequence 100? which
transforms X1 into X3 and X2 into X4; should leave preferences unchanged, i.e.
lead to X3 Â X4 whenever X1 Â X2.
Since they do not respect P2, these sujets cannot abide by the SEU crite-
rion. As a matter of fact, their behavior is incompatible with the very existence
of subjective probabilities pR; pB ; pY for elementary events R; B; Y : X1 Â X2
would imply pR > pB whereas X4 Â X3 would imply pB + pY > pR + pY ; a
contradiction.
To represent the situation described by Ellsberg, we have taken S 0 =
fR; B; Y g as set of states of nature and identi…ed the bets with applications
(acts) X : S 0 ! R:
We might have adopted another approach and taken a set of states of nature
composed of 61 states, S = fs0;s1; :::; sk; :::; s60g ; where a state sk corresponds
to a given composition of the urn: ”30 red balls , k blue balls, and (60 ¡ k)
yellow balls”.
The decisions are then identi…able with applications from S into Y , the set
of lotteries on C = f0; 100g (i.e. the set of all probability measures on C which
have a …nite support).
Thus, the uncertain prospect o¤ered by the decision giving a gain of 100? if
the ball drawn is blue and of 0? otherwise, which, in the initial formalization,
was described by act X2;is now characterized by application g2 associating with
every state of nature sk of S the corresponding lottery, (0; 90¡k90 ; 100;
k
90 ), i.e.
the lottery giving a null gain with probability 90¡k90 and a gain of 100? with
probability k90 :
This is the framework adopted in the model of Anscombe and Aumann
which we present below.
4 The theory of Anscombe and Aumann
The set of states of nature S is …nite. The algebra of events is A = 2S :
We denote by Y the set of lotteries on an outcome set C (i.e. the set of
all probability measures with …nite support in C). The set of acts F0 is then
de…ned as the set of all applications from S into Y .
An act of this kind is called a ”horse lottery” by reference to the sweepstake
tickets, which o¤er di¤erent random gains (lottery tickets) depending on which
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horse wins the race.
In this model, consequences are not outcomes ( elements of C) but lotteries
on C, which are elements of Y . The set Y is a mixture set (see linear utility
theory). By using this structure, one can de…ne, for all f and h in F0 and every
® in [0; 1], act ®f + (1 ¡ ®)h by
(®f + (1 ¡ ®)h)(s) = ®f(s) + (1 ¡ ®)h(s) for every s in S.
For this operation, F0 is itself a mixture set.
Preferences are de…ned by a weak order on set of acts F0, denoted by %.
Relation % induces a preference relation (also denoted by %) on the set of
lotteries, by identifying a lottery y of Y with the constant act ±y in F0 (the act
taking the same value,consequence y , for every s in S :)
for all y; z in Y ; y % z , ±y % ±z :
4.1 The Anscombe-Aumann axiom system
It consists in the following …ve axioms:
AA1 Ordering axiom
Preference relation% is a weak order on F0.
AA2 Continuity axiom
For all X , Y , Z in X0 , satisfying X Â Y Â Z; there exist ®, ¯ 2 ]0; 1[
such that
®X + (1 ¡ ®)Z Â Y Â ¯X + (1 ¡ ¯ )Z
AA3 Independence axiom
For all X; Y; Z in F0 and for every ® 2 ]0; 1],
X % Y () ®X + (1 ¡ ®)Z % ®Y + (1 ¡ ®)Z
AA4 Monotony axiom
For all X; Y in F0; [X(s) % Y (s); for every s 2 S] ) X % Y
AA5 non-triviality of preferences
There exists at least one pair of acts X; Y such that X Â Y
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4.2 Comments and discussion
The introduction, among the primitive concepts, of a set of lotteries Y presup-
poses the existence of ”exogeneous ”probabilities, i.e. which bear no relation
with the beliefs of the DM; this was not the case with the model of Savage, in
which the existence of a probability is always a result and never an assumption.
In the model of Anscombe and Aumann, the outcome of an act is deter-
mined in two steps: during the …rst step, the uncertainty about the states of
nature is resolved and the true state identi…ed; during the second step, the lot-
tery associated with this state is resolved, and the …nal outcome determined.
One of the important points of the proof of the representation theorem will
consist in showing that the order of resolution of the two kinds of uncertainty
is irrelevant for the DM.
The mixture set structure of F0 suggests to use formally the axioms of von
Neumann and Morgenstern. However, the acts of F0 being more complex
than probability measures, these axioms acquire a wider signi…cance; in partic-
ular, in this framework, the independence axiome implies, in the presence of the
other axioms, the validity of Savage’s Sure Thing principle.
4.3 The Anscombe-Aumann representation theorem
Theorem (Anscombe and Aumann)
Under axioms AA1 to AA5, preference relation % on F0 is representable
by a utility function,
V (:) : X 7! Ps2S U(X(s))P (fsg)
where P (:) is an aditive probability measure on (S; E),
and U(:) is the linear utility function on (L; %L).
P is unique and V (:); like U(:); is unique up to a strictly increasing linear
transformation.
In this theory, every type of uncertainty is reducible to subjective risk, and
the criterion under risk - under objective risk (lotteries) as under sub jective risk
- is the EU criterion.
The proof has several steps.
First, by restricting axioms AA1-AA3 to the constant acts ±y, identi…ed
with lotteries y , one remarks that von Neumann-Morgenstern theory ap-
plies to these constant acts; then, it is easily seen that the following represen-
tation is valid for general acts:
X % Y () U(X) > U (Y ) with U(X) = Ps2S Us(X(s))
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where each Us is a linear utility, i.e. where Us(X(s)) is the expectation of a
utility function us with respect to lottery X(s).
The preceding linear utilities Us depend on state s.
Now, by taking into account axioms AA4-AA5, , one can show that the Us
are in fact proportional and that there exists thus a unique probability measure
P such that ratio
Us
P (fsg) is independent of s. It su¢ces then to set
Us
P (fsg) = U
to obtain U (X) =
P
s2S U (X(s))P (fsg).
Remark 2 In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, since S is …nite, the ques-
tion of the ¾-additivity of probability P is pointless.
Remark 3 Fishburn (1970) has extended Anscombe-Aumann theory to an
in…nite set of states of nature ; in his extension subjective probability P is only
…nitely additive.
4.4 Back to the Ellsberg paradox
Let us show now that the Ellsberg paradox can be interpreted in the Anscombe
and Aumann theory framework as a violation of the independence axiom AA3:
Let us use formalization S = fs0;s1; :::; sk; :::; s60g ; where state sk corre-
sponds to urn content: ”30 red balls, k blue balls, and 60 ¡ k yellow balls”.
The uncertain prospect described by act Xi in Savage’s framework is now
characterized, in the framework of Anscombe and Aumann, by mapping gi
associating with each state of nature sk in S a a lottery as indicated in the
following table:
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act consequence on sk (k = 1; ::; 60)
g1 (t X1) (0; 6090 ; 100;
30
90 )
g2 (t X2) (0; 90¡k90 ; 100;
k
90 )
g3 (t X3) (0; k90 ; 100;
90¡k
90 )
g4 (t X4) (0; 3090 ; 100;
60
90 )
±0 (0; 9090)
f (0; 30+k90 ; 100;
60¡k
90 )
1
2
g1 +
1
2
f =
1
2
g3 +
1
2
±0 (0; 90+k180 ; 100;
90¡k
180 )
1
2
g2 +
1
2
f =
1
2
g4 +
1
2
±0 (0; 120180 ; 100;
60
180)
The 4 …rst lines of the table indicate what becomes of acts X1; X2; X3; X4
in this new framework.
One can note that acts g1; g4; ±0 are now constant acts.
Axiom AA3 and the equalities of mixtures of acts in the last two lines of
the table imply that:
g1 Â g2 () 12g1 +
1
2
f Â 1
2
g2 +
1
2
f
() 1
2
g3 +
1
2
±0 Â 12g4 +
1
2
±0 () g3 Â g4
Thus choices g1 and g4 in the experiment are indeed a violation of AA3.
5 Conclusion
The possibility of justifying, by rationality arguments, the most crucial axioms
of the theories of Savage and Anscombe andAumann has secured to the SEU
model the rank of dominant normative model. Moreover, its use being sim-
ple, SEU has become a major tool in economic theory as well as in domains
of application as diverse as insurance, …nance, management, health care, and
environment.
On the other hand, the limitations of SEU as a descriptive model, i.e. its
incapacity to take into account fairly common behavior (Ellsberg’s paradox),
may create di¢culties in applications: for instance, when assessing subjective
probabilities or constructing the utility function.
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There exists in the literature other models, which are more ‡exible than
SEU, and can look quite di¤erent from it. Nonetheless, the two axiom systems
which we have presented have invariably been the source of inspiration of those
of the alternative "new" theories.
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